CALALANG v. WILLIAMS, 70 PHIL 726, GR No. 47800, December 2, 1940
FACTS: The National Traffic Commission resolved that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along some major streets such a Rizal Ave. in Manila for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Secretary of Public Works approved the resolution on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
ISSUE: Does the rule infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice? What is Social Justice?
HELD: No. The regulation aims to promote safe transit and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated.
Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of Salus Populi est Suprema Lex.(Justice Laurel)
CASTOR-GARUPA v. ECC, 487 SCRA 171
FACTS: Petitioner is resident physician in a hospital in Negros Oriental, who was diagnosed of a kidney disease. After having her kidney transplant, she filed a work-related sickness compensation claim with the respondent ECC through the GSIS, which denied the same, arguing that the disease she contracted is not listed among the occupational diseases determined by them to be compensable as work-related sickness. Petitioner appealed contending that the bacteria causing the disease was contracted while being employed in the hospital since symptoms have already manifested since 1994, and relying upon the theory that her employment poses an increased risk in contracting the diseases.
ISSUE: Is the contention of the petitioner correct?
HELD: Yes. In determining whether an injury or sickness is work-related or not, what the law requires is reasonable work connection, not a direct causal connection. It is observed that the WCL has not ceased to be a social legislation, hence liberality of the law in the form of the workingman or woman still prevails.
GSIS v. VALENCIANO, 487 SCRA 109
FACTS: While being an employee of the Philippine Ports Authority, respondent was inflicted with tuberculosis, hypertension and diabetes. He then filed with the petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) a claim for compensation benefits under PD No. 626. However, petitioner denied the respondent’s claim on the ground that the ailments are not considered occupational diseases, and there is no clear evidence, such as medical records, showing that he contracted the diseases during his work or his duties have increased the risk of contracting said ailments. Petitioner rejected respondent's contention that there is probability of contracting TB with the kind of job the respondent has.
ISSUE: How should PD 626 be applied with respect to determining compensability of work-related diseases?
HELD: A social legislation should interpreted liberally. In applying liberality in the interpretation of Workmen's Compensation Law, the degree of proof required by the law is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept to support a conclusion. Probability, not certainty, is the touchstone. Any doubt on this matter has to be interpreted in favor of the employees considering that PD 626 is a social legislation.
PRIMICIAS v. FUGUSO, 80 PHIL 71
FACTS: Mayor Fuguso refused to grant the petitioner and his party a permit to hold a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, based on a city ordinance which grants the mayor the discretion to regulate such conduct of public assemblies, as a lawful exercise of police power.
ISSUE: What is police power? How was it supposed to be exercised by the Manila City Officials?
HELD: Police Power is the power of the State to enact laws and prescribe regulations that will promote the health, morals, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the People. However, in the exercise of police power the council may, in its discretion, regulate the exercise of such rights in a reasonable manner, but cannot suppress them, directly or indirectly, by attempting to commit the power of doing so to the mayor or any other officer. The ordinance grants the mayor the power to regulate as to how, when and where a public assembly should be held, but not the discretion to refuse the grant of such permit to derogate the right of the petitioner to peaceably assemble and seek redress against the government.
PASEI v DRILON, 163 SCRA 386
FACTS: The Department of Labor and Employment issued an order suspending the deployment of Filipino domestic and household workers, in view of the heightened abuses committed against OFWs abroad. The petitioner, a local recruitment agency, petitioned for the invalidation of such order for alleged violation of equal protection clause.
ISSUE: Is the deployment ban a valid exercise of police power? What is police power?
HELD: Yes, the deployment ban of domestic helpers is a valid exercise of police power. Police Power is the inherent power of the State to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty and property in order to promote the general welfare.
CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER (CMC) v. MERIS,
FACTS: Petitioner closed its industrial service unit due to alleged loss and extinct demand resulting to the termination of the employment of the respondent. The latter filed an illegal dismissal case but the same was denied by the labor arbiter, and subsequently by the NLRC contending that the same is part of the management prerogative.
ISSUE: Has employer the right to close its business even without basis resulting to the displacement of the worker?
HELD: No. Employers are also accorded with rights and privileges to assure their self-determination and independence and reasonable return of capital. This mass of privileges is called management prerogatives. Although they may be broad and unlimited in scope, the State has the right to determine whether an employer's privilege is exercised in a manner that complies with the legal requirements and does not offend the protected rights of labor.
BREWMASTER INTERNATIONAL INC. v. NAFLU
FACTS: Private respondent Estrada is a member of the respondent labor union. He did not report for work for 1 month due to a grave family problem as his wife deserted him and nobody was there to look after his children. He was required to explain. Finding his reasons to be unjustified, the petitioner terminated him, since according to company rules, absence for 6 consecutive days is considered abandonment of work.
ISSUE: Should a worker be summarily dismissed relying on some company rules?
HELD: No. While the employer is not precluded from prescribing rules and regulations to govern the conduct of his employees, these rules and their implementation must be fair, just and reasonable. No less than the Constitution looks with compassion on the workingman and protects his rights not only under a general statement of a state policy but under the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, thus placing labor contracts on a higher plane and with greater safeguards. Verily, relations between labor and capital are not merely contractual. They are impressed with public interest and labor contracts must, perforce, yield to the common good.
JAMER v. NLRC
FACTS: Petitioners are cashiers of Isetann Department Store who were dismissed for having accumulated shortages. Petitioners admitted this in their affidavits. The labor arbiter ruled them having been illegally dismissed. The NLRC reversed the ruling.
ISSUE: Were the petitioners validly dismissed?
HELD: Yes. The failure of the petitioners to report to the management the irregularities constitute "fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed in them by their employer or duly authorized representative"--one of the just causes of valid termination of employment. The employer cannot be compelled to retain employees who were guilty of malfeasance as their continued employment will be prejudicial to the former's best interest. The law, in protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.
GANDARA MILL SUPPLY v. NLRC
FACTS: Private respondent Silvestre Germane did not report for work because his wife delivered their first child. He did not however notify his employer, causing a disruption in the business of the latter. When the respondent returned to work he was surprised upon knowing that someone has been hired to take his place.
ISSUE: Was there a case of illegal dismissal?
HELD: Yes. It appeared that the respondent was illegally dismissed. While a prolonged absence without leave may constitute as a just cause for dismissal, its illegality stems from the non-observance of due process. Applying the WenPhil Doctrine by analogy, where dismissal was not preceded by the twin requirement of notice and hearing, the illegality of the dismissal in question, is under heavy clouds and therefore illegal.
PHIL MOVIE PICTURES WORKERS ASSOC. v. PREMIERE PRODUCTIONS, 92 PHIL 843
FACTS: Respondent filed 2 petitions with the CIR: 1.) to lay off its 44 employees on the ground that the company is losing its operations, and 2.) to lease its equipment to certain individuals. Judge Roldan of the CIR, after ocular inspection, approved the petitions, thereby leaving the petitioners, if not unemployed, having nothing to do because of absence of equipment in the studios. Petitioner assailed the ruling of the judge, and appealed to the CIR en banc.
ISSUE: Should the court grant a petition for mass dismissal without hearing the side of the employees concerned?
HELD: No. A worker cannot be deprived of his job or his wages without due process of law. The case was then remanded to CIR for proper hearing.
CALLANTA v. CARNATION PHILS., 145 SCRA 268, G.R. No. 70615 October 28, 1986
FACTS: Upon clearance approved by the MOLE Regional Office, respondent dismissed the petitioner in June 1979. On July 1982, petitioner filed an illegal dismissal case with claim for reinstatement with the Labor Arbiter, who granted it. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the judgment based on the contention that the action by the petitioner has already prescribed, since Art. 291 & 292 of the Labor Code is expressed that offenses penalized under the Code and all money claims arising from employer-employee relationships shall be filed within 3 years from when such cause of action arises, otherwise it will be barred.
ISSUE: Is ruling of the NLRC correct?
HELD: No. It is a principle well recognized in this jurisdiction, that one's employment, profession, trade or calling is a property right, and the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong. The right is considered to be property within the protection of the Constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
Verily, the dismissal without just cause of an employee from his employment constitutes a violation of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations. Such violation, however, does not amount to an "offense" as understood under Article 291 of the Labor Code. In its broad sense, an offense is an illegal act which does not amount to a crime as defined in the penal law, but which by statute carries with it a penalty similar to those imposed by law for the punishment of a crime. The confusion arises over the use of the term "illegal dismissal" which creates the impression that termination of an employment without just cause constitutes an offense. It must be noted, however that unlike in cases of commission of any of the prohibited activities during strikes or lockouts under Article 265, unfair labor practices under Article 248, 249 and 250 and illegal recruitment activities under Article 38, among others, which the Code itself declares to be unlawful, termination of an employment without just or valid cause is not categorized as an unlawful practice.
DE LEON v. NLU, 100 PHIL 789
FACTS: The defendant-appellees had been picketing the Dalisay Theater owned by the plaintiff for the purpose of securing reinstatement to their respective jobs in the theater when it was run and operated by the Filipino Theatrical Enterprises (FTE), then a lessee of the parcel of land owned by plaintiff on which the theater was erected. The defendant-appellees lost their jobs upon termination of the lease contract between De Leon and the FTE, which turned over the rights to the theater back to De Leon, the owner of the lot.
ISSUE: Has terminated employees the right to strike in this case?
HELD: Yes. Although the employees has no business with the owner of the establishment, they have nevertheless the right to peaceful picketing which applies also to cases where employer-employee relationship is absent. The picketing, a form of freedom of expression, is conducted not to disrupt the business of the owner but to appeal for a humanitarian consideration, after having been laid off due to the termination of the business of their previous employer.
PAFLU v. CLORIBEL, 27 SCRA 465
FACTS: Petitioner labor union picketed against Metrobank, which is occupying an office space in the Wellington building. Wellington complained that the picketers were annoyingly blocking the common passageway of the building, the only ingress and egress being used by the occupants of the second to the sixth floors thereof as well as by their respective employees, clients and customers, so that the picket has caused a disruption of the business of Wellington as well as the other lessors in the building.
ISSUE: Does the court have the power to enjoin the picket, despite being peaceful?
HELD: Yes. The courts are vested with the power to limit the exercise of the right of peaceful picketing to parties involved in the labor dispute, or having a direct interest to the context of this issue. Wellington is a mere "innocent bystander" who is not involved in the labor dispute. Thus, they are entitled to seek protection of their rights from the courts and the courts may, accordingly, legally extend the same.
LIWAYWAY PUBLICATIONS v. PCWU, 108 SCRA 16
FACTS: The picket held by defendant-appellant union against their employer prevented herein plaintiff-appellee's truck from loading and unloading of its products inside the premises of Permanent Concrete Products, where the plaintiff-appellee was occupying as a sub-lessee. Hence, the latter sought to enjoin the picket.
FACTS: The picket held by defendant-appellant union against their employer prevented herein plaintiff-appellee's truck from loading and unloading of its products inside the premises of Permanent Concrete Products, where the plaintiff-appellee was occupying as a sub-lessee. Hence, the latter sought to enjoin the picket.
ISSUE: May a picket be enjoined at the instance of a third party?
HELD: Yes. Peaceful picketing, while being allowed as a phase of freedom of expression guaranteed by the Constitution and could not be curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee relationship, is not an absolute right. The courts are not without power to localize the sphere of demonstration, whose interest are foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus the right may be recognized at the instance of an "innocent bystander" who is not involved in the labor dispute if it appears that the result of the picketing is create an impression that a labor dispute exists between him and the picketing union.
KAPISANAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CAMARA SHOES v. CAMARA SHOES, 111 SCRA 478
FACTS: Petitioner Ramos was suspended for writing the phrase "under protest" in the company payroll to object to the P1.0 deduction made by the respondent for allegedly getting P500 worth of lumber in 1964. The deduction started only in 1969, at the peak of union activities of the petitioner when several complaints of unfair labor practices were filed by the union against the respondent.
ISSUE: Is the action of the petitioner a lawful exercise of freedom of expression?
HELD: Yes. The freedom of expression is available to individual workers subject to legal limitation of industrial peace to air valid grievances. It is thus too clear from the foregoing that petitioner Ramos was justified in airing his grievances against the unauthorized and illegal deductions made by respondent company. By writing "under protest" on the company payroll, petitioner Ramos was well within the ambit of his constitutional freedom of expression as well as the right to petition against what was obviously a calculated undue harassment amounting to unfair labor practice perpetuated by respondent employer herein.
VICTORIANO v. ERWU, 59 SCRA 54
FACTS: Stepping on the provisions of RA 3350 exempting members of religious sects which prohibit its members from joining associations, plaintiff-appellee, being of a faithful of Iglesia ni Cristo, withdrew his membership from the appellant union. The latter, who have pact a closed-shop provision in their collective bargaining agreement with respondent company sought the separation of the plaintiff-appellee. The trial court enjoined the supposed dismissal, prompting the union to assail the validity of RA 3350 particularly the provision granting exemption to members of above-mentioned sects.
ISSUE: Does the law infringe the right or freedom of labor to associate?
HELD: No. Freedom of association implies not only the right to join a labor union, but also the privilege of not joining one, of selecting which union to join, and of disaffiliating from a union. It is clear that the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join.
REPUBLIC SAVINGS BANK v. CIR, 21 SCRA 226
FACTS: Petitioner bank terminated private respondents for having written and published a "patently libelous letter tending to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt not only the officers and employees of the bank, but also their employer" by demanding the resignation of the bank president on grounds of immorality, nepotism and favoritism. CIR ruled that the petitioner's act constitutes an unfair labor practice.
ISSUE: Does the dismissal of employees airing their grievance against their employer constitute unfair labor practice?
HELD: Yes. Even assuming that respondents acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter, they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of their right to self-organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, interference with which constitutes unfair labor practice.
The petitioner should have allowed the respondents to air their grievances as a mechanism in a collective bargaining agreement. Collective bargaining... normally takes the form of negotiation when major conditions of employment to be written into an agreement are under consideration, and of grievance committee meetings and arbitration when questions arising from the administration of an agreement are at stake.
SSS EMPLOYEES ASSOC. v. CA, 175 SCRA 686
FACTS: Petitioners went on strike after their employer SSS failed to act upon the union's demands concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed an injunction contending that the petitioners are covered by Civil Service laws which prohibits employees of the government from staging a strike. SSSEA on the other hand, argued that the NLRC has the jurisdiction of the case by virtue of the provisions of the Labor Code.
ISSUE: Does the court have jurisdiction? Do employees covered by the Civil Service have the right to strike?
HELD: On question of jurisdiction, yes. The RTC, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction under BP 129, has jurisdiction over petitioner's claim for damages and for the issuance of a writ of injunction to stop the strike, since the Labor Code do not apply to government employees.
On the right to strike of government workers, No. The Constitution provides guarantee among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities. On the other hand, EO 180 provides that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities in government service shall be observed subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress. Referring to Memo Circular No.6, s. 1987 of the CSC which states that prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees, enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officials and employees from staging a strike, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service, the court ruled that in the absence of any legislation allowing government employees to strike, they are therefore prohibited from doing so.
GARCIA v. PAL, GR 164856, Jan. 20, 2009
FACTS: PAL filed an administrative case against Garcia and Dumago after they were allegedly caught sniffing shabu at the PAL Tool Room. After due notice, they were dismissed for transgressing the PAL Code of Discipline. The petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of petitioners with an immediate reinstatement. A writ was issued to such effect pending appeal with the NLRC.
ISSUE: Can the petitioners collect wages on the period of appeal from the Labor Arbiter’s order up to the final decision of the higher court?
HELD: Yes. The State forcefully and meaningfully underscore labor as a primary social and economic force. In short, with respect to decisions reinstating employees, the law itself has determined a sufficiently overwhelming reason for its execution pending appeal. Therefore, the petitioners can collect wages from the period of the execution of the decision of the labor arbiter to the time of the final decision of the higher court.
MORTERA v. CIR, GR L-1340, Oct. 13, 1947
FACTS: All laborers of Canlubang Sugar Estate were ordered to return to work immediately and stop the strike with the admonition that those who will fail to report will not only lose any concession but the company was authorized by the public respondent herein to employ new employees or laborers to take the places or positions of those who fail to report. The public respondent ordered that picketing under any guise or form, is entirely prohibited considering that the industry was into sugar, a very important and essential food, lack of supply would mean destruction of sugar centrals of many provinces.
ISSUE: Was there a denial of the right to strike?
HELD: Yes. The order on prohibition to strike should be understood to cover only illegal picketing, that is, picketing through the use of illegal means. Peaceful picketing cannot be prohibited. It is part of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution. Petitioners have not shown reasons to annul the order. Petition dismissed.
FELIX UY v. COA, GR 130685, March 21, 2000
FACTS: Petitioners were among the more than 60 dismissed permanent employees of the Capitol of Agusan del Sur by the newly incumbent Governor Paredes. They contended that the dismissal was a political vengeance because he hired new employees. The Governor averred that the dismissal was not illegal because it was due to the reduction in work force due to lack of funds and it is a valid ground of terminating the services of the employees. The Merit System Protection Board held the dismissal illegal and ordered their reinstatement but Governor Paredes refused to abide from the order. The COA on the other hand affirmed the decision of the MSPB but denied the motion of the petitioners stating that it is the personal liability of Governor Paredes and not the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur.
ISSUE: Can government employees receive backwages and other monetary benefits from the government?
HELD: Yes. If the MSPB found bad faith on the part of Governor Paredes, it would have categorically decreed his personal liability for the illegal dismissal of the petitioners. To be sure, even the petitioners did not proceed from the theory that their dismissal is the personal liability of Governor Paredes. Familiar learning is our ruling that bad faith cannot be presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the onus of proving it. In the case at bar, the decision of the MSPB by itself does not meet the quantum of proof necessary to overcome the presumption of good faith.
TIRAZONA v. PHILIPPINE EDS TECHNO-SERVICE (PET) INC
FACTS: The petitioner, a managerial employee who was holding a position of trust and confidence, was admonished by the latter of her improper handling of a situation involving a rank-and-file employee. She admitted having read a supposed confidential letter for the PET directors containing a legal opinion of the respondent's counsel regarding the status of her employment. As a consequence, she was terminated for willful breach of trust reposed upon by her employer. She claimed having been denied of due process.
ISSUE: Was her dismissal justified?
HELD: Yes. The petitioner has given the respondent more than enough reasons to distrust her. The arrogance and hostility she has shown towards the company her stubborn uncompromising stance in almost all instances justify the company's termination of her employment.
PANTRANCO v. PSC, GR 47065, June 26, 1940
FACTS: Petitioner wanted to have Sec. 1 of CA 454 be declared unconstitutional or that if constitutional be declared inapplicable to valid and subsisting certificates issued prior to its enactment. This arose from the time petitioner applied for ten additional trucks to comply with his existing certificates of public convenience issued before the enactment of the CA 454 because he was not agreeable with the conditions set forth by PSC. He contended that this Act violates the constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of contracts.
ISSUE: Was the constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of obligations and contracts violated?
HELD: No. Statutes for the regulation of public utilities are a proper exercise by the state of its police power for the control and regulation of public utilities in order to protect the public. If one voluntarily placed his property in public service, he cannot complain of the regulation of the State through its police power. A regulation of public utilities applies not only to future but also to present contracts in operation. Such statutes are, therefore, not unconstitutional, either impairing the obligation of contracts, taking property without due process, or denying the equal protection of the laws, especially inasmuch as the question whether or not private property shall be devoted to a public and the consequent burdens assumed is ordinarily for the owner to decide.
PALMERIA v. NLRC, 247 SCRA 57
FACTS: Palmeria was employed by private respondent Coca-cola, which later entered into a contract of service with Lipercon Services. It was made to appear that the petitioner was an employee of Lipercon, before being dismissed by Coca-cola. Petitioner was able to prove his employment with Coca-cola, hence sought for reinstatement. The labor arbiter and NLRC ruled that reinstatement could not be availed of because of the vehement refusal of the respondent to accept back the petitioner.
ISSUE: Should the petition for reinstatement be granted despite the strained relations between employee and employer?
HELD: Yes. The importance of the remedy of reinstatement to an unjustly dismissed employee cannot be overstated. It is the remedy that most effectively restores the right of an employee to his employment and all its benefits before its violation by his employer. Yet despite all its virtues, reinstatement does not and cannot fully vindicate all of an employees injuries for reinstatement no more than compensates for his financial damages. It cannot make up for his other sufferings, intangible yet valuable xxx It is a right which cannot be allowed to be devalued by the purchasing power of employers who are only too willing to bankroll the separation pay of their illegally dismissed employees to get rid of them.
BANGALISAN v. CA, 276 SCRA 619
FACTS: Petitioners were among the 800 public school teachers who staged “mass actions” on September 17 to 19, 1990 to dramatize their grievances against the alleged failure of the government to implement measures intended for their material benefit. The Education Secretary issued a Return-to-Work Order but the petitioners failed to comply. Hence they were charged by the Secretary with several administrative cases leading to their dismissal from service.
ISSUE: Can government employees engage in a strike?
HELD: No. As a general rule, even in the absence of express statutory prohibition like Memo Circ. No.6 public employees are denied the right to strike or engage in work stoppage against a public employer. The right of the sovereign to prohibit strikes or work stoppages public employees was clearly recognized at common law. To grant employees of the public sector the right to strike there must be a clear and direct legislative authority therefor. In the absence of any express legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, employees in the public service may not engage in strike, walk-outs and temporary work stoppage like workers in the private sector.
KAISAHAN v. GOTAMCON SAWMILLS, 80 PHIL 521
FACTS: During the pendency of the labor dispute between the petitioners and the respondents, the CIR managed to forge a voluntary agreement which results into a return-to-work order, and the respondents was prohibited to, among others, lay-off any of the petitioners. Barely 4 months the contract, petitioners again staged a strike, violating the condition of the agreement. The latter countered by assailing the Sec 19 of CA 103, the law upon which the voluntary agreement was based, arguing that the same results to involuntary servitude.
ISSUE: Should a voluntary agreement with a condition that workers must return to work be voided upon a ground of involuntary servitude?
HELD: No. An employee entering into a contract of employment voluntarily accepts, among other conditions, those prescribed in Section 19 of CA 103. The voluntariness of the employee's entering into it or not--with such implied condition, negatives the possibility of involuntary servitude ensuing.
MABEZA v. NLRC, G.R. No. 118506 April 18, 1997
FACTS: The petitioner and her co-employees were asked by their employer to sign an instrument attesting to the latter’s compliance with minimum wage and other labor standard provision, and that they have no complaints against the management. The petitioner signed the affidavit but refused to go to the City’s Prosecutor’s Office to confirm the veracity and contents of the affidavit as instructed by management. That same day she was ordered by the hotel management to turn over the keys to her living quarters and to remove her belongings in the hotel’s premises. She then filed a leave of absence which was denied by her employer. She attempted to return to work but the hotel’s cashier told her that she should not report to work and instead continue with her unofficial leave of absence. The management defended upon a ground of loss of confidence.
ISSUE: Was the dismissal of the petitioner valid?
HELD: No. The pivotal question in any case where unfair labor practice on the part of the employer is alleged is whether or not the employer has exerted pressure, in the form of restraint, interference or coercion, against his employee’s right to institute concerted action for better terms and conditions of employment. Without doubt, the act of compelling employees to sign an instrument indicating that the employer observed labor standard provisions of the law when he might not have, together with the act of terminating or coercing those who refuse to cooperate with the employers’ scheme constitutes unfair labor practice.
BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORP. v. SANCHEZ, 144 SCRA 628
FACTS: Supervisors and managers in petitioner company formed a union separate from that of the rank-and-file union, petitioned for certification election, and staged a strike against the petitioner, prompting the latter to seek a permanent injunction.
ISSUE: Are supervisors or managers allowed by law to form a union?
HELD: No. The supervisory employees of petitioner firm may not, under the law, form a supervisors union, separate and distinct from the existing bargaining unit (BEU), composed of the rank-and-file employees of the Bulletin Publishing Corporation. It is evident that most of the private respondents are considered managerial employees. xxx The rationale for this inhibition has been stated to be, because if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also become company- dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership.